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Payment by results in the prison system – challenges of
calibrating success and failure
Last week the Ministry of Justice published its interim evaluation of the ‘payment by results’
(PBR) pilots at Peterborough and Doncaster prisons. Designed to test out how PBR might
create sustainable mechanisms to reduce prisoner reoffending, the pilots can now tell us
something about reconviction outcomes. The results, says Simon Bastow, are modest and
hardly the stuff of revolution. Indeed, they show how affecting change in a complex policy
system is an incremental game.
Bringing about ‘rehabilitation revolution’ in the prison system was never going to be easy.
This is an area, af ter all, that has suf f ered f rom a persistent sense of  f atalism over the decades about the
extent to which prisons can or should be expected to rehabilitate. And the f act that the system has prided
itself  on running at close-to-tolerance levels of  capacity day- in day-out has also sustained a healthy
appreciation of  the constraints on the realms of  possibility in this area.
So the PBR pilots at Peterborough and Doncaster have af f orded opportunity to see what is or may be
possible when prisons and those that work in them are directly incentivized to f ocus on rehabilitative
outcomes. What might we expect in terms of  reduction of  reconviction rates f rom such explicit attention?
And what is the potential f or changing cultures and mind-sets around rehabilitation? This interim report
provides a usef ul insight into the size of  the challenge.
At Peterborough, the pilot started in September 2010, and has tracked the reconviction rates of  a cohort of
prisoners sentenced to less than 12 months. At Doncaster, the pilot started a year later, and tracked
reconviction rates of  prisoners of  all sentences. For this interim analysis, of f enders were tracked f or a
period of  6 months (+3 months) af ter release f rom custody (whereas in the f inal assessment, of f enders
will be tracked f or 12 months (+6 months). As Table 1 below shows, the criteria on which reconviction
outcomes were judged varied between the two prisons.
Table 1: Headline interim outturns from the pilots
A lot hinges, of  course, around the baseline or threshold that triggers payment f or successf ul results. For
Peterborough, this baseline will be a yet- to-be-decided ‘control group’ based on national reconviction
outcomes. In absence of  a control group, the report compares reconviction outcomes against the
equivalent 2009 level. Here the requirement is that the number of  ‘reconviction events’ per 100 of f enders
should decrease by at least 10 per cent f or payment mechanisms to be triggered. Compared to the 2009
level, the reduction is 6 per cent. For Doncaster, the requirement is slightly dif f erent in that it is the actual
reconviction rate (i.e. the percentage of  of f enders reconvicted) that should decrease by at least 5 per cent.
The outcome in this interim cohort is 4.9 per cent.
What should we make of  these results? Not surprisingly, Chris Grayling and the Ministry have described
them as ‘encouraging’, heading in the right direction, and so on. Indeed, as the report shows, national
reconviction rates have continued to climb, whereas the pilots have shown that trends can at least be set in
reverse.
Four to 6 per cent change, however, seems modest. One might expect an individual prison, incentivized
explicit ly over at least two years to reduce the rate of  reconviction amongst 700 or 800-or so prisoners
leaving its care, would be able to make more than a 4 to 6 per cent impact. In Doncaster, this equates to
changing the behaviour of  1 prisoner in every 20 prisoners released. In f act, as the report suggests, this is
a continuation of  a trend that had started in Doncaster long bef ore the pilot was introduced. In
Peterborough, the equivalent marginal impact is more like 1 prisoner in every 40.
Are there signs of  threshold ef f ects? Here providers would do just enough to get over the threshold and
trigger payments, but not much more. In both cases, neither pilot exceeded its threshold, so this does not
seem to be an obvious problem. In the case of  Doncaster, the outcome lags by only 0.1 per cent behind the
threshold, and we assume that that would not have triggered payment. It is unlikely that this has been
gamed theref ore. In theory, the idea of  ‘threshold gaming’ is of ten attractive, but in reality it is much harder
to micro-manage perf ormance, especially in an area like reconvictions where there are so many external
variables at play. In the case of  Peterborough, the outcome lags 4 per cent behind the threshold, even if  it
is an indicative baseline rather the control group measure that is planned. One wonders what implications
this would have f or commercial viability f or providers and investors.
Underpinning all this are important questions around how we calibrate acceptable thresholds of
rehabilitation success, i.e. how the control group is constructed and what ‘black box’ assumptions are made.
Lurking in the report is ref erence to the Of f ender Group Reconviction Scale (OGRS), a modelled predictor
of  re-of f ending based on the particular prof ile of  an of f ender group in question. Put simply, this allows
analysts to control f or variations in severity of  sentence and misdemeanour in the of f ender group, and to
calibrate actual rehabilitation outcomes accordingly. This dif f erence between actual (i.e. with no weighting
f or the of f ender prof ile) and notional rates of  rehabilitation (i.e. weighted to take of f ender prof iles into
account) has long been central to the way in which the Ministry has reported its rehabilitative perf ormance.
We can illustrate this variation between ‘actual’ and ‘notional’ rehabilitation’ rates in the two graphs below.
These are based on Ministry of  Justice data (2011). Whereas actual rehabilitation shows f airly f lat trends
over the last ten years, once we f actor in the changes in the modelled prof ile of  the of f ender population,
we f ind that notional rehabilitation shows a much improved picture of  rehabilitative perf ormance.
Figure 1: Actual reconviction rates, by length of sentence of offender groups
Figure 2: Modelled or notional reconviction rates, by length of sentence of offender groups
These graphs illustrate the bind that the prison system f aces in evaluating and communicating its
perf ormance on rehabilitation. On the one hand, it seems reasonable that we should judge perf ormance of
the system on its ability to ‘add value’ f rom a consistent baseline. It has af ter all only very limited inf luence
over the prof ile of  the of f ender population that it must rehabilitate, and if  the prof ile is constantly changing
or becoming more intractable, let’s say, then it seems f air that we should f actor this underlying change into
our assessment of  its rehabilitative perf ormance.
On the other hand, there are clear dif f icult ies in talking about ‘notional’ rehabilitation and not actual real- lif e
rehabilitation. For polit icians and senior of f icials, the predicament is clear. Anything that needs a model and
pages of  technical explanation is never going to be easily sold to the public or the tabloid press. Context is
death in this case. Even if  the context is articulated in accessible terms, there are still irresolvable
arguments about the model that is used, the ‘black box’ assumptions that are made, and so on.
For those who argue that the prison system has always struggled to articulate its own ‘successes’, this is a
classic example as to why. At a notional level, the system has been successf ul in reducing reof f ending in
the last ten years. The dif f icult ies of  articulating this in real terms means that we should not be surprised if
supporting evidence is buried away on page 33 (Table A5) of  an impenetrably dense Ministry of  Justice
statistical bulletin!
The predicament theref ore f or the Ministry is how to calibrate a baseline f or ‘success’, one that delivers on
rehabilitative goals, and one that manages to align polit ical, commercial, and analytical considerations. As
these graphs show, there is broad scope within to f inesse the threshold accordingly. Indeed, the
construction of  the control group is conspicuous by its absence in this interim analysis, and this will clearly
play a deciding role in determining between success and f ailure of  the providers’ rehabilitative ef f orts. As
we have seen, the numbers suggest that there will be a f ine balance to strike here between these various
considerations.
Not surprisingly, this report is silent on the polit ical and commercial side of  things. The schemes have
produced 4 to 6 per cent impact on reconviction, but at what cost to the providers and with what
implications f or sustainability of  the PBR mechanism at large? The polit ical and reputational pressures on
both sides show that, though this is a viable model f or the system as a whole, the f inancial costs would be
absorbed in order to make a case f or expansion of  PBR. Government and the private sector have much
invested already. So it remains to be seen how much capacity stress has been exerted on the stakeholders
involved in delivering this 4 to 6 per cent marginal gain.
These are of  course only interim results f rom the f irst round of  experiments – and we await later cohorts
and rounds of  evaluation into 2014. For those who were worried that we would have to wait until 2014 f or
any f indings or insights f rom these pilots, it is an entirely usef ul glimpse at the constraints and complexit ies
of  it all. For the prison-watching community (academic and practit ioners alike), the whole exercise also
shows how applied social science analysis (i.e. in this case, through constructive use and open reporting of
pilots) can play a real- t ime role in the incremental development of  a policy revolution.
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